Atlanta Injury Attorney Blog

On September 20, 2005, Debra Ford was driving in the right lane on Interstate 16. Vanessa McGrogan, an employee of International Paper Company, was allegedly driving 77 mph in a 70 mph speed zone and using her company-issued cell phone. McGrogan rear-ended Ford's vehicle, causing Ford's vehicle to flip and slide along the road. As a result, Ford sustained severe arm injuries and ultimately had to have her arm amputated.

Ford sued McGrogan and her employer, alleging intentional negligence under the GA cell phone statute. She claimed McGrogan was distracted by the use of her cell phone and was negligent in speeding.

Georgia has a cell phone statute, OCGA § 40-6-241, which permits reasonable cell phone use while driving, but prevents drivers from doing anything that is distracting. Ford alleged that McGrogan's cell phone use was not reasonable because she was speeding. Because the evidence indicated that McGrogan's cell phone use was unreasonable, Ford was able to raise the issue of intentional negligence and to seek punitive damages. The International Paper Company agreed to settle the case for $5.2M.

Georgia law bans all cell phone use for school bus drivers and novice drivers; those under the age of 18. Additionally, a text messaging ban went into effect on July 1, 2010 in the State of Georgia for all drivers.

Lynn Wheeler was riding to church with her family on Christmas Day in 2005. She was seated between her two grandchildren in the backseat of a 2002 Ford Explorer. There was no three point restraint in Wheeler's seat, only a lap belt. Defendant John T. Stanley lost control of his car and crashed head-on into the Explorer. Upon impact, Wheeler's head and neck were forced into the back of the front seat and/or center console. She suffered spinal injuries resulting in quadriplegia, abdominal injuries, and a ruptured intestine. Wheeler remains on a ventilator for life support. No other passengers in the Explorer sustained any serious injuries.

Wheeler alleged Stanley was negligent in failing to maintain control of his vehicle and in crossing over the center line. Furthermore, she alleged Ford Motor Company was negligent in its design of the rear seat latch and in installing a lap belt rather than a three-point shoulder restraint. Wheeler presented evidence which proved Ford knew about the dangers of lap-only belts for more than 30 years, but delayed installation of the safer three-point shoulder straps to save money. She also argued that the rear seat was located too close to the vehicle's frontal structures, allowing occupants to hit their heads.

The jury entered $17.7M verdict in compensatory damages. The judgment against Stanley was for $1.3M and against Ford for $16.4M. A settlement was reached regarding punitive damages.

Ford argued the Explorer met or exceeded all government safety standards established for the 2002 model, but the jury punished the auto maker for taking shortcuts by failing to install the three-point shoulder restraint when they knew lap belts posed a safety risk to passengers.

In Hyperdynamics Corp. v. Southridge Capital Management LLC, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 709 (Ga. Ct. App. July 16, 2010), the Georgia Court of Appeals held that nonresident defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in the state of Georgia pursuant to the Georgia Long Arm Statute. The Long Arm Statute, OCGA § 9-10-91, allows a plaintiff to procure personal jurisdiction in the state of Georgia over a nonresident defendant. The statute applies when the plaintiff can show that his claim relates directly to the defendant's actions with the state of Georgia.

Hyperdynamics filed suit alleging that the defendant resident and nonresident corporations conspired to defraud it by inducing it to enter into a contract through fraud and concealment, the intention of which was to covertly take over majority ownership of the corporation. The trial court dismissed the action as to the nonresidents, finding that they fell outside of its personal jurisdiction.

On appeal, Hyperdynamics argued that the conspiracy among the residents and nonresidents offered sufficient connection to Georgia to confer jurisdiction over the nonresidents. The Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction in Georgia was proper over the nonresidents under the theory of conspiracy jurisdiction. The corporation submitted sufficient documentary evidence to show that the residents and nonresidents engaged in a conspiracy to defraud it, so as to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresidents.

Under the theory of "conspiracy jurisdiction", the in-state acts of the residents could be imputed to the nonresidents so as to satisfy the specific contact requirements set forth in the Georgia Long Arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. The State's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresidents did not offend due process. The record contained sufficient evidence that the nonresidents purposefully directed their activities toward Georgia and could reasonably expect to be haled into court there. The nonresidents took deliberate actions directed toward the State designed to facilitate a potentially lucrative business opportunity in conjunction with the residents.

Georgia courts will exercise long arm jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when the nonresident, in person or through an agent, transacts any business within the state or commits a tortious act or omission within this state. Additionally, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with due process; jurisdiction cannot offend the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Due process requires that the defendant have purposefully directed conduct toward Georgia and have a sufficient level of contact with the state that they could reasonably expect to be sued in Georgia.

Recent Georgia Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the statute to mean that a defendant can be "transacting business" in Georgia without ever setting foot in the state. Therefore, physical presence in Georgia is no longer a requirement for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

The Delius Law Firm handles catastrophic injury claims in cases involving car accidents, premises liability (including assaults at apartments, shopping centers, motels or hotels) and workers' compensation.

A Georgia state statute (OCGA § 17-5-21(a)(5)) limits when authorities can obtain a search warrant for "private papers." In 1993, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the statute protected papers relating to the "doctor-patient" privilege (the GA Legislature does not recognize such a privilege). Thirteen years later, the Court decided to question the 1993 decision.

Phillips Byrd Brogdon, Jr. rear-ended another vehicle in December 2007. He was treated at Gwinett Medical Center. In the resulting case, prosecutors obtained records of Brogdon's visit to the hospital which proved he was diagnosed with alcohol intoxication and had a blood alcohol content of 0.329. The judge allowed the medical records to be introduced as evidence in the trial and the Supreme Court elected to consider the question of whether "private papers" applies to a search warrant issued for medical records maintained by a hospital.

The Court held that the term "private papers" covered those papers that "belonged to the accused" or were "in his possession." Medical records did not meet that test; therefore they were not covered by the privilege. The decision will make it easier for prosecutors to obtain defendants' medical records in DUI cases. Such records may also be important in drug overdose and domestic violence situations.

The holding opens the door for future constitutional challenges.

Royalston v. Middlebrooks (A10A0314) - Auto Accident

At 7:00 a.m. on July 28, 2005, John S. Royalston, who was driving a truck for the Georgia Sandwich Company, Inc. (GSC), struck Collie Middlebrooks's pickup truck. Middlebrooks suffered severe and permanent injuries as a result of the accident and brought a personal injury action against Royalston and GSC.

An eyewitness testified that Royalston was "speeding" and "repeatedly changed lanes and passed vehicles." Additionally, a traffic accident reconstructionist testified that based on his investigation, Royalston could have avoided the collision if he had been driving the speed limit or paying attention. Royalston testified that he had two speeding tickets on his record when he was hired by GSC and that he had received six additional speeding tickets between the time he was hired by GSC and the time of the accident. The evidence showed that GSC had knowledge of Royalston's driving habits.

The jury awarded Middlebrooks $3.06M in compensatory damages, $1M in punitive damages, and $621.78K in attorneys' fees. In May 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment against Royalston and GSC and held that the damages were not unreasonable.

Georgia corporations can be held responsible for their negligent decisions to hire and retain reckless drivers.

If you've been injured in an auto accident, contact the Delius Law Firm at 404-352-3400 today.

Judge James V. Selna of Santa Ana, California has hand-picked twenty-six attorneys to lead the nationwide litigation against Toyota Motor Corp. Toyota has recalled more than eight million of its vehicles due to sudden and uncontrolled acceleration. The litigation against Toyota includes 200 lawsuits. Most of the lawsuits seek economic damages for consumer classes whose recalled vehicles have lost value, the rest are personal injury claims on behalf of individuals who were injured or died when their cars accelerated out of control.

Judge Selna appointed twenty-two plaintiffs' lawyers and four defense lawyers for Toyota. Most of the attorneys have worked together in the past and all have handled complex litigation. Many of the attorneys were involved in the massive tobacco litigation in the 1990s and lead the litigation over recalled painkillers Vioxx, Celebrex, and Bextra. Others spearheaded the litigation against Ford and Firestone over recalled tires linked to Ford Explorer accidents. A few of the attorneys were picked for their expertise in handling airplane and train crash litigation.

All of the appointed attorneys are "familiar with the difficult terrain of personal injury cases," particularly those involving automobiles. Toyota's two lawyers who will be defending the economic loss claims come from Atlanta.

The outcome of the litigation will determine Toyota's liability and serve as a guide for future lawsuits against the auto-maker.

Chrysler has announced that it will begin a recall of almost 600,000 minivans and Jeep Wranglers later this month. About 289,000 Jeep Wranglers manufactured in 2006-2010 will be recalled due to a potential brake fluid leak. Additionally, about 285,000 Dodge Grand Caravan and Chrysler Town & Country minivans, from 2008 and 2009, will be recalled due to a wiring problem that can cause a fire inside the sliding doors.

Chrysler will notify owners and dealers about the repairs and will repair the vehicles free of charge. Although no injuries or deaths have occurred yet, Chrysler seems eager to avoid the liability Toyota faces for its malfunctioning automobile parts.

Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98-Ga. LLC (A10A0703)

Billy Joe Grundell lost control of his car, drove it across the median, and collided head-on with a van, killing six people and seriously injuring three. Grundell's blood alcohol level proved he was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Four hours prior to the collision, an Exprezit convenience store employee sold packaged beer to Grundell. Grundell was noticeably intoxicated at the time and the employee knew he would be driving a car soon.

The Georgia Dram Shop Act (GDSA) provides that "when a person sells alcoholic beverages to a noticeably intoxicated buyer, who the seller knows will soon be driving a motor vehicle, the seller may be liable for resulting injury or damage when the buyer drives while intoxicated from consumption of those alcoholic beverages." Liability will be imposed upon an alcohol supplier when the alcohol is supplied for legal consumption on the supplier's premises. In this case, however, the alcohol sold by Exprezit was not intended to be consumed on the store premises. In fact, it was illegal for Grundell to consume the alcohol on the store's premises or in his vehicle.

The court held Exprezit was not liable for the accident because the alcohol was not supplied for consumption on Exprezit's premises. Furthermore, the GDSA did not require that before selling the beer, the Exprezit employee investigate when and where Grundell would drink the beer. Exprezit did not have a duty to determine whether Grundell would drink the alcohol before driving.

The GDSA imposes liability on alcohol suppliers for serving intoxicated individuals who they know will be driving, but limits that liability to suppliers who sell for purposes of direct consumption on their property.

Call the Delius Law Firm for help with your Georgia Dram Shop case at 404-352-3400.

Debora Gurgel was involved in a disputed liability car crash. Each side claimed the other was at fault, and each side had injuries and medical bills. Gurgel's attorney asked the other driver's insurance carrier, State Farm, for $150K and State Farm "did not offer a dime." Gurgel and her attorney went to trial.

Gurgel testified she had a solid green light and the defendant testified he had a green turn arrow. An eye-witness testified that the defendant's car did not stop at the light before turning left. Gurgel's attorney proved that the traffic light was programmed in such a way that a car would have to stop in order to get a green turn arrow. At trial, Gurgel asked for $475K. The jury granted Gurgel a verdict of $500K, plus another $18.5K for her child, who sustained injuries in the accident.

The jury clearly believed Gurgel's testimony and the witness was able to disprove the defendant's testimony. They jury punished State Farm for insurance bad faith for failing to accept the $150K settlement offer and trying to avoid liability when their policy holder was negligent.

If you have a car wreck case where your insurance company refused to pay and exposed you to an excess jury verdict, call the Delius Law Firm at 404-352-3400.

At 7:00 a.m. on July 28, 2005, John S. Royalston, who was driving a truck for the Georgia Sandwich Company, Inc. (GSC), struck Collie Middlebrooks's pickup truck. Middlebrooks suffered severe and permanent injuries as a result of the accident and brought a personal injury action against Royalston and GSC.

An eyewitness testified that Royalston was "speeding" and "repeatedly changed lanes and passed vehicles." Additionally, a traffic accident reconstructionist testified that based on his investigation, Royalston could have avoided the collision if he had been driving the speed limit or paying attention.

Royalston testified that he had two speeding tickets on his record when he was hired by GSC and that he had received six additional speeding tickets between the time he was hired by GSC and the time of the accident. The evidence showed that GSC had knowledge of Royalston's driving habits.

They jury awarded Middlebrooks $3.06M in compensatory damages, $1M in punitive damages, and $621.78K in attorneys' fees. In May 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment against Royalston and GSC and held that the damages were not unreasonable.

GSC will be held liable for Royalston's negligence and will pay for their decision to hire and retain a reckless driver.

Judge James V. Selna of Santa Ana, California has hand-picked twenty-six attorneys to lead the nationwide litigation against Toyota Motor Corp. Toyota has recalled more than eight million of its vehicles due to sudden and uncontrolled acceleration. The litigation against Toyota includes 200 lawsuits. Most of the lawsuits seek economic damages for consumer classes whose recalled vehicles have lost value, the rest are personal injury claims on behalf of individuals who were injured or died when their cars accelerated out of control.

Judge Selna appointed twenty-two plaintiffs' lawyers and four defense lawyers for Toyota. Most of the attorneys have worked together in the past and all have handled complex litigation. Many of the attorneys were involved in the massive tobacco litigation in the 1990s and lead the litigation over recalled painkillers Vioxx, Celebrex, and Bextra. Others spearheaded the litigation against Ford and Firestone over recalled tires linked to Ford Explorer accidents. A few of the attorneys were picked for their expertise in handling airplane and train crash litigation.

All of the appointed attorneys are "familiar with the difficult terrain of personal injury cases," particularly those involving automobiles. Toyota's two lawyers who will be defending the economic loss claims come from Atlanta's Alston & Bird.

The outcome of the litigation will determine Toyota's liability and serve as a guide for future lawsuits against the auto-maker.

By Atlanta car accident lawyer Scott Delius.

A Clayton County, Georgia State Court jury returned a verdict of $17, 716,401 for a passenger injured in a Ford Explorer accident. The passenger was seated in the middle seat, which only had a lap belt. When the Explorer was struck head on the passenger's head was driven into the back of the front seat, paralyzing her.

The Plaintiff alleged that Ford was negligent in deciding to install a lap belt instead of the customary three point seatbelt with a shoulder restraint. She also alleged that the rear seat was too close to the front seat.

The jury found that Ford was also liable for punitive damages, but the parties reached a confidential settlement during punitive damages deliberations

The Georgia Supreme Court answered the question of how to determine the meaning of the term "accident" in a Georgia car accident case when the word is not expressly defined in the insurance policy. Specifically, the Court showed how to determine if there has been one accident or two when an insured vehicle strikes one plaintiff and then very shortly thereafter strikes another.

In State Auto Property and Casualty Co. v. Matty et al. (S09Q1846), a vehicle driven by State Auto's insured car struck a bicycle rider, killing him. The car then struck a second bicyclist, seriously injuring him. An accident reconstruction expert testified that, assuming the car had traveled at a constant speed of 55 miles per hour from the point it struck the first bicyclist to the point where it struck the second one, it would have taken her "just over a second" to travel the 95 to 115 feet between the two bicyclists.

The issue was whether this constituted one accident or two accidents for purposes of liability insurance coverage. The driver of the car had $100,000.00 of liability coverage available. State Auto Insurance contended that this incident involved only one accident, meaning that the victims had to divide the $100,000.00. The victims argued that the incident was really two accidents, and therefore there should have been $100,000.00 in liability coverage available to each victim.

The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that Georgia follows the "cause theory" in determining the amount of insurance coverage applicable in a catastrophic car wreck in Georgia involving multiple victims. Regardless of the number of victims, a single accident occurred for insurance purposes if all victims were injured by the same cause.

In this case, the opinion left it up to the trial court to determine, under the specific facts, whether the two collisions were two accidents.

One of the lawyers in the case, Dustin Brown, saw this blog post and offered this statement to help clarify the opinion:

"The opinion addressed the law, but it left it up to the [trial] court to apply the law in determining whether there were two accidents or one. The opinion did make clear that if a driver regained control between two collisions, there are two accidents for purposes of insurance coverage. The only evidence here is that the driver did regain control between the two collisions."

The Georgia Supreme Court decided the legal issue by a slim 4 - 3 majority. It will be interesting to see how the trial court will apply it to the facts of the case.

If time permits, we will do our best to settle your Georgia auto accident case for a fair amount with the other driver's auto insurance company. However, if there is not enough time to settle the case, or the settlement offer is not enough, then we may have to file a lawsuit against the other driver.

Clients are sometimes under the impression that we actually sue the other driver's insurance company. That is usually not the case. Normally, we have to sue the other driver personally, and then their insurance company hires a lawyer to defend them. If you have been involved in a car wreck in Georgia with a commercial vehicle or if you have been in a tractor trailer accident or truck accident, then we would sue the driver and the company that they worked for at the time of the wreck.

The lawyer for the insurance company will file what is called an "Answer" in response to the car wreck lawsuit. The Answer has the other driver's responses to each element of the lawsuit. The other driver will either admit or deny liability and usually will dispute the kind of injuries that you suffered in the auto wreck. How does the other driver know about your injuries? They don't. However, they do so just so they can reserve that defense if they need it later.

Even though we sue the other driver personally, his or her car insurance company dictates or "calls the shots" for them during the litigation. In other words, the car insurance company decides whether to fight the case, to settle or to take the case to trial. The other driver doesn't really have much input. The car insurance adjuster tells the other driver's lawyer what to do, even though the other driver is really the lawyer's client.

After the Defendant is served with the lawsuit, they file an "Answer" to the lawsuit. After the Answer to a lawsuit is filed, the parties to a car wreck case start a process called "discovery." During discovery, the parties exchange non-privileged information about the case. Typically we will give the other side all of the medical bills and medical records related to your auto accident. Often times the insurance company will ask for all of your medical records even before the accident to determine whether you have any pre-existing injuries. We deal with those kinds of requests on a case by case basis.

During discovery, you will most likely have to attend your deposition. A deposition is where the insurance company lawyer comes to our office to ask you questions about the car accident under oath. Mr. Delius will be there to represent you and object if there are any improper questions. A court reporter will also be present to write down everything that is said. Mr. Delius will prepare you thoroughly for your deposition so that you know what to expect.

Typical deposition questions involve your work history, your health history and detailed questioning regarding the car wreck. You will be required to tell how the accident happened. Was it a rear end wreck? Did another vehicle cross the center line and hit you? Was the other driver speeding or driving recklessly before the accident? What were the road conditions like? Was it raining right before or during the auto accident? Did the other driver receive a ticket? Was the other driver drunk or driving under the influence before the wreck? What did the investigating police officer say after the accident? These are some questions that you can expect to encounter during your auto accident deposition.

The Georgia courts are very busy. Although the discovery period is only supposed to last for six months in Georgia, it can take up to a year or more for your case to reach a jury trial. We have tried many cases all over the State of Georgia, in metro Atlanta counties like Fulton, DeKalb, Gwinnett, Cobb, Clayton, Douglas and Henry. We have also tried cases in other corners of the state, such as Rabun, Lowndes, Hall, Whitfield, and Bibb. No matter whether your car wreck happened in Atlanta, Augusta, Albany, Columbus, Macon, Gainesville, Savannah or Valdosta, we can handle it.

So what happens during a car accident trial? No matter where the case is being tried, we almost always ask for a jury to decide whether to award compensation and how much compensation to award a car wreck victim. We usually spend a day "striking" a jury. This is a process by which the jury members are selected. The lawyers actually "strike" or eliminate people within the jury pool. Once each side has used up its strikes, we are left with a jury of twelve and maybe a couple of alternates. These jurors will hear your car accident case.

During an automobile accident trial, both sides call witnesses and cross examine each other's witnesses. After all the evidence has been given to the jury, they decide the case. They decide whether the other party is at fault, and if so, how much compensation they should be ordered to pay the car wreck victim.

This brings up an interesting and little known fact. The jury never gets to hear about the other driver's insurance company, or how much liability insurance coverage the other driver has. In fact, the word "insurance" is never mentioned during a car accident jury trial. If it is, a mistrial is usually declared and the process must start all over again.

Why is the word "insurance" never spoken during a car crash trial? Because the law says that a jury must consider each party as individuals, and if the jury knew that one individual has insurance coverage, the jury might be more inclined to punish them if the jury knows they have coverage. So the jury never gets to hear whether the responsible driver has insurance or how much liability insurance they have.

Once the jury has made its decision, it will announce its verdict. This is the end of the case unless one of the parties decides to appeal, which involves another long process which we will discuss in another article.

If you have questions about your car accident injuries or Georgia car accident litigation, please call the Delius Law Firm today. We look forward to helping you.