The Plaintiff asserted there was an extensive history of prior crime on the property, including sexual assaults. The Defendants failed to implement any security measures and there was not a single camera on the property. The Defendants agreed to a $2.5M settlement.

The general rule regarding premises liability is that a landlord does not have a duty to protect tenants' safety against third-party criminal attacks. However, OCGA § 51-3-1 states that landlords have a duty to "exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe." This duty extends to foreseeable criminal acts. Therefore, if the landlord has reason to anticipate a criminal act, he has a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against injury from dangerous situations.

In this case, the Defendants knew that similar crimes had previously occurred on the property, they had time to implement security measures, and they failed to do so. Landlords cannot avoid liability by failing to take action when they know about dangerous conditions on their property.

Ford sued McGrogan and her employer, alleging intentional negligence under the GA cell phone statute. She claimed McGrogan was distracted by the use of her cell phone and was negligent in speeding.

Georgia has a cell phone statute, OCGA § 40-6-241, which permits reasonable cell phone use while driving, but prevents drivers from doing anything that is distracting. Ford alleged that McGrogan's cell phone use was not reasonable because she was speeding. Because the evidence indicated that McGrogan's cell phone use was unreasonable, Ford was able to raise the issue of intentional negligence and to seek punitive damages. The International Paper Company agreed to settle the case for $5.2M.

Georgia law bans all cell phone use for school bus drivers and novice drivers; those under the age of 18. Additionally, a text messaging ban went into effect on July 1, 2010 in the State of Georgia for all drivers.

The plaintiff's attorney said that the trial could have been avoided if Domercant's insurance company had complied with his request for the policy limits of $300,000, but the insurance company failed to respond on time. Due to the insurance company's inaction, Domercant now has a bad faith claim against the insurer for the exposure he faces above his policy limits.

If you have a case where your insurance company failed to settle a case against you within your policy limits, and exposed you to an excess judgment, contact the Delius Law Firm at (404) 352-3400 or at www.deliuslaw.com

Wheeler alleged Stanley was negligent in failing to maintain control of his vehicle and in crossing over the center line. Furthermore, she alleged Ford Motor Company was negligent in its design of the rear seat latch and in installing a lap belt rather than a three-point shoulder restraint. Wheeler presented evidence which proved Ford knew about the dangers of lap-only belts for more than 30 years, but delayed installation of the safer three-point shoulder straps to save money. She also argued that the rear seat was located too close to the vehicle's frontal structures, allowing occupants to hit their heads.

The jury entered $17.7M verdict in compensatory damages. The judgment against Stanley was for $1.3M and against Ford for $16.4M. A settlement was reached regarding punitive damages.

Ford argued the Explorer met or exceeded all government safety standards established for the 2002 model, but the jury punished the auto maker for taking shortcuts by failing to install the three-point shoulder restraint when they knew lap belts posed a safety risk to passengers.

Hyperdynamics filed suit alleging that the defendant resident and nonresident corporations conspired to defraud it by inducing it to enter into a contract through fraud and concealment, the intention of which was to covertly take over majority ownership of the corporation. The trial court dismissed the action as to the nonresidents, finding that they fell outside of its personal jurisdiction.

On appeal, Hyperdynamics argued that the conspiracy among the residents and nonresidents offered sufficient connection to Georgia to confer jurisdiction over the nonresidents. The Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction in Georgia was proper over the nonresidents under the theory of conspiracy jurisdiction. The corporation submitted sufficient documentary evidence to show that the residents and nonresidents engaged in a conspiracy to defraud it, so as to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresidents.

Under the theory of "conspiracy jurisdiction", the in-state acts of the residents could be imputed to the nonresidents so as to satisfy the specific contact requirements set forth in the Georgia Long Arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. The State's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresidents did not offend due process. The record contained sufficient evidence that the nonresidents purposefully directed their activities toward Georgia and could reasonably expect to be haled into court there. The nonresidents took deliberate actions directed toward the State designed to facilitate a potentially lucrative business opportunity in conjunction with the residents.

Georgia courts will exercise long arm jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when the nonresident, in person or through an agent, transacts any business within the state or commits a tortious act or omission within this state. Additionally, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with due process; jurisdiction cannot offend the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Due process requires that the defendant have purposefully directed conduct toward Georgia and have a sufficient level of contact with the state that they could reasonably expect to be sued in Georgia.

Recent Georgia Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the statute to mean that a defendant can be "transacting business" in Georgia without ever setting foot in the state. Therefore, physical presence in Georgia is no longer a requirement for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

The Delius Law Firm handles catastrophic injury claims in cases involving car accidents, premises liability (including assaults at apartments, shopping centers, motels or hotels) and workers' compensation.

On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court found that the art. I, § I, para. XI(a) constitutional right to a jury trial included the right to a jury trial for claims involving the negligence of a health care provider, with an attendant right to an award of the full measure of damages, including noneconomic damages, as determined by a jury.

The Court further found that the noneconomic damages caps in § 51-12-1 unconstitutionally infringed on this right. By requiring a trial court to reduce a pain and suffering award determined by a jury that exceeded the statutory limit,
§ 51-13-1 nullified the jury's findings of fact regarding damages, and thus, undermined the jury's basic function.

The fact that § 51-13-1 permitted full recovery of noneconomic damages up to $ 350,000 was not relevant because the very existence of the caps, in any amount, violated the right to trial by jury. The Court further found that § 51-12-1 was wholly void from the date it was enacted.

The general rule allows the statute of limitations to be tolled for minors or those who are incapacitated due to mental disability. A 1987 Georgia statute exempts most medical malpractice cases from this general rule. In DEEN et al. v. STEVENS et al., 2010 Ga. LEXIS 590 (July 23, 2010), the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected the family's challenge and upheld the 1987 statute.

This holding means that the majority of medical malpractice cases must be brought within the statute of limitations time frame, or they will be barred. No exceptions for minors or mentally handicapped individuals are permitted.

As a result, it is imperative that family members who want to bring a lawsuit on behalf of a minor or incapacitated individual pay attention to the statute of limitations and ensure they file a lawsuit within the requisite time limit.

In a Georgia premises liability suit based on a "slip and fall" or "trip and fall" claim, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard and that the plaintiff, despite exercising ordinary care for his personal safety, lacked knowledge of the specific hazard due to the defendant's action or inaction. In Georgia, a curb is classified as a "static defect." A claim involving a static defect differs from other "slip and fall" cases. When an individual has successfully negotiated the static hazard on a previous occasion, the individual is presumed to have equal knowledge of the hazard and cannot recover for an injury resulting from the dangerous condition. However, this rule only applies to a static condition that is "readily discernible" to a person exercising reasonable care. During the trial, a professional engineer testified that the curb was too high, the lighting in the area was poor, there was no warning sign or handrail, and the curb was not painted or marked.

The Court said that Morrell Perkins was an invitee on the property and therefore did not have a duty to look continuously for defects. In order to determine liability, the jury must determine whether the specific hazard was "readily discernable" to Mr. Perkins in the exercise of ordinary care, and therefore whether it can be presumed that he had knowledge of it.

The Court of Appeals held that there was enough evidence for the case to go to trial and for the Plaintiff to avoid summary judgment.

The Court of Appeals stated: "Rule 205, on its face, establishes a rebuttable presumption of compensability in favor of the claimant upon an ATP's request for advance authorization to provide medical care in that the injury is presumed compensable unless the insurer denies authorization and controverts the treatment. With the employer/self-insurer's failure to timely respond, a conclusive presumption of compensability results. In both instances, the effect of Rule 205 is to shift the burden the claimant would otherwise bear to show the injury is compensable as work-related. Commercial Union Assn., 143 Ga. App. at 64 (1). We conclude, therefore, that insofar as that aspect of Rule 205 precluding an employer from contesting the compensability of treatment is in issue, 1 Rule 205 is invalid as substantive rule-making which impermissibly shifts the claimant's burden of proof to show that an injury is work-related and invades the province of the legislature."

For Georgia workers' compensation claimants, the question is whether Board Rule 205 is completely invalid or not.

In our view, if a case is already compensable, there is obviously no need for claimant to carry the burden of establishing compensability. Therefore, Rule 205 could still be used in a compensable case. Therefore, the rule would still require the employer/insurer to make a prompt decision on specific treatment by the authorized treating physician, and places the burden on employer/insurer to controvert that specific treatment within five days.

It will be interesting to see how this plays out.

If a property owner has reason to anticipate a criminal act, they then have a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against this risk of harm. The court will examine prior criminal activity on the premises to determine the foreseeability of the crime. In order to be "foreseeable," the crime must be substantially similar to previous criminal activity.

In this case, the criminal attack was foreseeable because the plaintiff had specifically warned the owner about the exact method of entry that the criminal utilized.

The landlord has a higher duty of care if the individual is a licensee. A licensee is permitted to be on the property for social purposes (they are usually a social guest). The landowner has a duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises safe. He must protect licensees from known hazards on the premises.

The landlord has the highest duty of care if the individual is an invitee. An invitee is a person who is invited onto the property for business reasons (customers of a business, job applicants etc...). As with licensees, landowners have a duty to repair and correct known dangers in order to keep the property safe. Additionally, a landowner must reasonably inspect for and correct unknown hazards.

Gwendolyn sued Super 8 Motel, alleging that Super 8 failed to exercise care to keep the premises safe for motel guests. Super 8 failed to perform a criminal background check on the male employee before hiring him and entrusting him with a master key. Additionally, the Super 8 manager knew that while he was employed at Super 8, the employee had been arrested several times on various charges. The jury returned a verdict for $550,000 in Gwendolyn's favor.

An employer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring individuals who, because of the type of employment, may pose a threat to members of the public. An employer is liable for negligent hiring and retention if the employer knew or should have known that its employee had violent and criminal propensities. However, the employer does not need to foresee the employee's specific behavior. An employer may be liable if they failed to accurately check an employee's references, criminal records, or background information that may have shown the employee's likelihood for criminal behavior. Additionally, an employer may be liable if they failed to dismiss an employee after finding out the employee was a violent or abusive individual.

Phillips Byrd Brogdon, Jr. rear-ended another vehicle in December 2007. He was treated at Gwinett Medical Center. In the resulting case, prosecutors obtained records of Brogdon's visit to the hospital which proved he was diagnosed with alcohol intoxication and had a blood alcohol content of 0.329. The judge allowed the medical records to be introduced as evidence in the trial and the Supreme Court elected to consider the question of whether "private papers" applies to a search warrant issued for medical records maintained by a hospital.

The Court held that the term "private papers" covered those papers that "belonged to the accused" or were "in his possession." Medical records did not meet that test; therefore they were not covered by the privilege. The decision will make it easier for prosecutors to obtain defendants' medical records in DUI cases. Such records may also be important in drug overdose and domestic violence situations.

The holding opens the door for future constitutional challenges.

On April 8, 1998, a tornado struck the Park Lake apartments, which were owned by MRP Park Lake LP and managed by Realty Management Corporation. The storm caused severe damage to the apartment complex. After the storm, a Realty Management employee assigned two contract workers to fix a leak in Sandra Atkins's roof. The workers placed a tarp over the roof. The tarp had no holes and covered the vent pipes, creating a toxic environment as it trapped carbon monoxide. Atkins was diagnosed with carbon-monoxide poisoning and subsequently filed a personal injury suit against MRP and Realty Management. In November 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the judgment in favor of the defendants.

In Georgia, an employer generally is not responsible for torts committed by independent contractors. However, if a landowner's duty is imposed by statute, it is "non-delegable" and the landowner may be held liable for the independent contract workers' negligence. Under the Georgia statute, landowners have a duty to keep their rented premises in good repair. Liability is imposed on the landlord for any damages resulting from defects in the premises. In this case, the contract workers repaired the roof in a negligent fashion, thus creating a defect in the premises. Therefore, MRP and Realty Management may be liable.

It is important to note that a landlord cannot avoid liability by simply hiring an independent contractor to perform its statutorily-imposed duties.

If you've been injured due to landlord negligence anywhere in Georgia, call the Delius Law Firm at 404-352-3400.

At 7:00 a.m. on July 28, 2005, John S. Royalston, who was driving a truck for the Georgia Sandwich Company, Inc. (GSC), struck Collie Middlebrooks's pickup truck. Middlebrooks suffered severe and permanent injuries as a result of the accident and brought a personal injury action against Royalston and GSC.

An eyewitness testified that Royalston was "speeding" and "repeatedly changed lanes and passed vehicles." Additionally, a traffic accident reconstructionist testified that based on his investigation, Royalston could have avoided the collision if he had been driving the speed limit or paying attention. Royalston testified that he had two speeding tickets on his record when he was hired by GSC and that he had received six additional speeding tickets between the time he was hired by GSC and the time of the accident. The evidence showed that GSC had knowledge of Royalston's driving habits.

The jury awarded Middlebrooks $3.06M in compensatory damages, $1M in punitive damages, and $621.78K in attorneys' fees. In May 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment against Royalston and GSC and held that the damages were not unreasonable.

Georgia corporations can be held responsible for their negligent decisions to hire and retain reckless drivers.

If you've been injured in an auto accident, contact the Delius Law Firm at 404-352-3400 today.